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Abstract 
 
 
The EMU governance has showed to be incapable of an 
effective crisis management following the global downturn. 
The recent decisions by European Council taken in March 
2011, named the ‘Pact of the Euro’, to design a new 
governance of the EMU can be considered a significant attempt 
to give new and effective national budgetary rules,  crisis 
management and resolution principles and procedures, 
economic policy framework to the Member States of the euro 
area, although several questions remain open. 
    The present work seeks to investigate the causes of the crisis 
of the euro area and review the debate about the future of the 
EMU. Moreover this contribution evaluates critically the new 
governance of the EMU and the economic policy framework 
established by the Pact of the Euro underlying the need of 
adequate institutions, greater cooperative attitude and  political 
coherence.  
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Introduction 
 
      The European Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of 
the euro, its common currency, have been an important 
economic and political achievement. Yet, the EMU governance 
has showed to be incapable of an effective crisis management, 
whereas the institutions have proved to be hesitant and without 
a real political leadership. In the meantime Europe has become 
a low growth macro-region in decline with respect to the rising 
powers of China, India and other emerging countries. 
     The recent decisions by European Council taken in March 
2011, named the ‘Pact of the Euro’, to design a new 
governance of the EMU can be considered a significant attempt 
to give new and effective national budgetary rules,  crisis 
management and resolution principles and procedures, 
economic policy framework to the Member States of the euro 
area, although several questions remain open. 
    The present work seeks to investigate the causes of the crisis 
of the euro area and review the debate about the future of the 
EMU. Moreover this contribution evaluates critically the new 
governance of the EMU and the economic policy framework 
established by the Pact of the Euro underlying the need of 
adequate institutions, greater cooperative attitude and  political 
coherence.  
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1. The crisis in the euro area and its causes. 
 
       The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 stipulated that the future 
governance of the EMU was based on a monetary union 
without a significant federal budget, on a limited coordination 
of budgetary and structural policies, with no form of integrated 
financial supervision, with no political authority to 
counterbalance the (future) European Central Bank (ECB). 
Because of this asymmetry in the governance, the Treaty 
introduced some safeguards: i) the no-bailout clause, which 
established that national governments alone were in charge of 
their budget and that no European government or official 
institution was allowed to rescue another eurozone member in 
case of public debt difficulties1; ii) the ECB was barred from 
financing public debts. All this was considered by many of its 
writers as a temporary situation that would develop later2.  
     So in 1999 the EMU began with the launch of the euro. In 
1997 the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
should have guaranteed that fiscal discipline would be 
maintained and enforced in the EMU3. Consequently, Member 
States adopting the euro have to meet the Maastricht 
convergence criteria, the SGP should ensure that eurozone 
countries will continue to observe them. 
    Coordination of national fiscal policy was facilitated by the 
Eurogroup (Eurozone Financial Ministers), which emerged as a 
forum for informal coordination. Therefore the budget policy 
in each country of the eurozone should have been under 
                                                 
1 The clause really espressed a ‘no-coresponsibility’ principle for public debts 
(Art.125 of the Treaty). Even if any euro area country could request assistance from 
IMF. 
2 Although Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) made clear that a monetary union 
without a fiscal union was incomplete. 
3 SGP aimed at keeeping deficits below 3% of GDP in normal times and debt levels 
below, or at leats heading towards, 60% of GDP.   
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control, although in practice this has not happened, because of 
the lack of an effective mechanism of enforcement in the Pact4.  
Banking and financial market regulations were also left to 
national governments, with only loose coordination, because of 
the assumption that financial markets “would work well”. 
Finally, competitiveness policy was almost overlooked in the 
institutional design of the EMU. 
      Despite some underlying weaknesses that have 
characterized the euro since its inception, the results of EMU 
governance were pretty good. In fact, the EMU has been 
relatively successful for almost ten years, by keeping the 
macroeconomic stability of the entire euro area with inflation 
rates close to the target of the ECB and with fiscal policies of 
EMU countries which did not differ significantly from the 
objective of the SGP. The adoption of the euro has also 
facilitated structural reforms in the product markets5. Over the 
decade the euro area has enjoyed an high per capita income and 
a substantial  balance of the eurozone’s overall trade account.     
Furthermore, the euro has become an important currency in the 
global monetary system, but without replacing the dollar as the 
currency of reference of the whole system; in fact, it carved a 
significant place over the borders of the euro area in the strict 
sense, becoming the second international reserve currency after 
the dollar at the global level6.  
       With the outbreak of the global crisis of 2008-2009, 
probably the worst in the world economy since the 1930s, 
many countries of the euro area have relied on state spending 
                                                 
4 Paradoxically, France and Germany were the first two countries that have not 
respected the SGP, as in 2003-04 they have been lobbying to change the original 
SGP, to make it ‘more flexible’. 
5 Alesina, Ardagna, Galasso (2010) who underlined that the same did not happend in 
the labour market. 
6 Pisani-Ferry, Posen (2009). 
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to drive growth, so they have recorded high deficit/GDP ratio 
and rising public debt. 
     Table 1 describes the deficit and the debt as percentage of 
GDP for the 16 euro countries in 2009.7 
                                          Table 1. 
                       Deficit/GDP (2009)           Debt/GDP (2009) 
                              (percentage values)           (percentage values) 
Austria                           3.4                                     66.5 
Belgium                          6.0                                     96.7 
Cyprus                            6.1                                     56.2 
Finland                           2.2                                     44.0 
France                             7.5                                     77.6 
Germany                         3.3                                     73.2 
Greece                           13.6                                    115.1 
Ireland                          14.3                                      64.0 
Italy                                 5.3                                    115.8 
Luxemburg                     0.7                                      14.5 
Malta                               3.8                                       69.1 
Netherlands                     5.3                                      60.9 
Portugal                           9.4                                      76.8 
Slovakia                            6.8                                     35.7 
Slovenia                            5.5                                     35.9 
Spain                               11.2                                     53.1 
Euro Area                         6.3                                     78.7 
Source: Eurostat 
                                                 
7 Since January 2011 Estonia joined the euro, so that the euro area members  have 
now become 17. 
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      The Table shows that nearly all the countries of Eurozone 
accumulated large deficit/GDP ratio in 2009. The average 
value of Deficit/GDP ratio for the whole eurozone was 6.3%. 
While the average growth rate of real GDP for the 16 member 
countries was, in the period 2001-2009, 1.08%; in particular it 
was 0.6% in 2008 and – 4.1% in 2009. This means that 
eurozone’s GDP has been growing much less than budget 
defict and public debt. Moreover, most of the countries have 
also increased their debt, in fact only six countries out of 
sixteen had debt/GDP ratio less than 60% in 20098. All this has 
created deep concerns about the fiscal sustainability and the 
credibility of whole eurozone. However, the euro area 
countries most affected by the crisis: Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain – the “GIPS”– have spent and lived beyond their 
means by accumulating private and/or public debt and running 
large current account deficits. Particularly Greece has 
accumulated a huge sovereign debt of about 310 billion euros, 
mainly due to public finance mismanagement, so that its 
financial esposition prevented the Greeek government to find 
capital in the financial markets, therefore Greece became at 
risk of sovereign default. But also Ireland was in a risky 
position because of the large private debt due to the 
mismanagement of its banks. 
      The behaviour of all these countries of course was at odds 
with euro participation and raised the issue of the future 
existence of the euro. So the vision about the governance of 
EMU and its principles changed significantly and a debate on 
the future of the euro was opened, while the crisis cleraly 
showed the lack of coherence of European politics. 
 
                                                 
8 Really, from 1980 to 2007 nearly all the OECD governments increased their 
indebtedness ratio, this happened because short-term economic needs and electoral 
interestes prevailed over the long-term sustanaibility issues. 
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3.The debate on the euro area crisis. 
 
     The crisis inevitably opened a debate on the political and 
economic governance of the EMU, which has been criticized 
mainly because of the lack of crisis management and resolution 
regime, the incompleteness of the economic policy framework, 
the unclear role of the European institutions.        
     Barry Eichengreen has correctly underlined the need for 
Europe to build out the institutions of its monetary union to be 
able to avoid similar crises in the future9.  
     Transparency is called by Burda and Gerlach10,  who 
suggest a new SGP that significantly increases fiscal 
transparency through a creation of an independent committee 
of fiscal experts (a “Fiscal Stability Board”) able to evaluate 
objectively the national budgets and to impose sanctions on the 
countries  that do not keep their fiscal house in order. Fatás and 
Mihov11 also agree on the crucial role of an independent 
institution (i.e. a fiscal policy council) to monitor and enforce 
the national fiscal policy. These authors propose a sort of 
“constrained discretion” on national budgetary policy with the 
aim of ensuring sensible policy in the long run.  
     The fiscal policy failure is certainly an important cause 
which was necessary to trigger the crisis in Greece, but it was 
not sufficient per se to create panic throughout the euro area, if 
the banks were strong enough and not interconnected with the 
sovereign debt12. So many scholars argued that the main causes 
of the crisis have been the increasing debt and the serious 
difficulties of the banking system, that are inevitably 
                                                 
9 Eichengreen (2009). 
10 Burda, Gerlach in Baldwin et al. (2010, pp.65-68). 
11 Fatás, Mihov in Baldwin et al. (2010, pp.69-72). 
12 Banks of the euro area are largely exposed to the peripheral countries. 
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intertwined, where the interconnectedness aspect is the crucial 
one.  
     Another important point is that the crisis has exposed flaws 
in the peer review process which put disproportionate emphasis 
on fiscal discipline, while no one was paying attention to 
excessive home consumption and to the current account 
deficits, due to the false convergence between bond yields post 
EMU launch, which left the “GIPS” countries borrowing at 
rates little higher than Germany, leading to large speculative 
inflows, higher wages and a loss of competitiveness. 
     But a major cause why the global financial crisis struck the 
euro area severely was that it coincided with a period of weak 
political leadership which has made crisis management even 
harder. 
     According to Pisani Ferry (2010),  since the governance of 
the EMU has been incomplete and ineffective, it necessary to 
reformulate the economic policy framework considering also 
the problems of competitiveness, of trade imbalances and of 
low and uneven growth inside the eurozone13. He is also 
favorable to governance reforms that encourage 
decentralisation by rewarding countries with better institutions 
or rules14.  
      We share the view that if the eurozone economy wants to 
survive in the medium-long term, it will be necessary that its 
institutions must provide an effective crisis resolution system, a 
better fiscal policy co-ordination, which should take in 
perspective towards a fiscal union, coopetitive policies to 
                                                 
13  Moreover, a policy regime is complete if it provides for how to behave  in 
different conditions (in good times and in times of bad times). 13 Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir (in Pisani-Ferry, Posen 2009, p.71) already argued that the qualities that are 
expected from a policy system in cisis times are clearly different from those 
expected from the same system in normal times. 
14 Pisani-Ferry (2010, p.7): “decentralisation may be the best way to strengthen the 
ownership of policy rules”. 
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reduce intra-eurozone imbalances. Furthermore, the euro area 
should have a single European bond. 
 
4. The new governance of the EMU 
 
    In the last two years policy measures have been taken by the 
EU institutions and by the single countries, except for some 
hesitation, to start the adjustment process. In May 2010 a 
program of financial aids supported by the eurozone countries 
and by IMF to help Greece was provided because the country 
was on the verge of insolvency15. Another important measure 
was the ECB’s  “secutities market programme” by which ECB 
buys government debt of fiscally “challenged” countries16. The 
ECB’s decision helped the member countries most affected by 
the crisis – the “GIPS” –  to finance their 2010 budget deficits. 
Then it was decided to implement the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), that will run out in 2013, which gives 
credits to countries in financial troubles17.   
     The European Commission, following the crisis, stated that 
there are two other important objectives of economic policy in 
addition to the price stabilty and fiscal discipline: one is 
financial stability, which has become evident and necessary 
                                                 
15 However, the crisis of Greece, despite the EU-IMF bailout financial program and 
the severe austerity measures taken by the Greek government, is still far to be 
solved. 
16 To sterilize this move the ECB conducts liquidity absorbing operations of the 
same magnitude. Effectively, the ECB is buying risky assets issued by a fiscally 
troubled governement of the eurozone and, via its sterilization operations, selling its 
claims on banks, which is equivalent of selling new assets. A move that might be 
viewed as an improper risk transfer. 
17 EFSF bases its rules of the crisis management regime on the principles and 
procedures of the “IMF doctrine”. The EFSF operates in the case of unstainable 
fiscal policies and sovereign debt crises. 
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after the crisis,  the other is the avoidance of – or at least to 
contain – macroeconomic imbalances. 
     The identification of two new targets raises the question of 
the definition of the instruments, which requires better 
coordination of economic policies among member countires.  
      In a paper by Carfì and Schilirò (2010), we suggested that 
the macroeconomic imbalances, such as trade imbalances, can 
be addressed through a coopetitive strategy, which implies a 
cooperative attitude among the national governments of the 
euro area, despite their divergent interests. The coopetitive 
strategy will provide a win-win solution to the actors of the 
game and can constitute a new macroeconomic policy tool to 
help solving the imbalances problems and contribute to 
overcome the economic crisis in a medium-run perspective. 
      The EMU governance, established in the Maastricht Treaty, 
had a no bail-out clause to limit the cooperative attitude among 
the member countries of the EMU; this choice was made to 
underline the individual responsibily of the governments and to 
emphasize the strong faith in the market capacity to overcome 
any difficulties. But this clause revealed itself too rigid and 
irrealistic in crisis time. The new rules of the EMU governance 
cointained in the “Pact of the Euro”  have transformed the old 
no-bailout clause in another irrealistic rule concerning the crisis 
resolution. The eurozone leaders committed to increasing the 
lending capacity of the current rescue fund, the EFSF18, 
making it able to bail out several  eurozone countries should 
the debt crisis continue to spread19. They also established the 
creation of a permanent post-2013 fund  – the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) – that will be able to lend up to 
                                                 
18 From about €250bn to its full, headline level of €440bn. 
19 Greece and Ireland were the two troubled eurozone countries that asked the 
European Union for emergency support to ensure that they could continue to finance 
their debt. Portugal has become the third in April 2011. 
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€500bn, likely to be achieved through guarantees from triple-A 
states. In the face of German and Dutch resistance, the leaders 
chose to set some limits. The fund will be able to buy bonds, 
but only directly from a struggling government and only after 
that government agrees to austerity measures. However these 
new financial facilities can only be used in a narrow set of 
circumstances20, which limit their application and convenience 
for the struggling countries. 
     The agreement reached by eurozone’s leaders was a smart 
politically compromise. Unfortunately, compromise could not 
work in a debt crisis. There are, in essence, two ways to solve a 
debt crisis: through a bail-out or through default.  The leaders 
of the euro area got itself an arrangement that represents only 
an emergency facility and constitutes a scarsely credible 
intermediate solution between bail-out and default. 
To understand this agreement, it is important to focus on some 
technical aspects of the financial rescue mechanisms. The 
current EFSF will run out in 2013. It gives credits to countries 
in trouble, and may soon buy their bonds on the primary 
markets. These rank on the same terms with everybody else’s 
investments. That means, should the country default, 
everybody gets hit equally. If, say Greece, were to default 
today, Germany and France would have to keep their credit 
guarantees to the EFSF, but this would be a political disaster.  
The creditor nations would therefore not allow a default until 
2013. In 2013, the new ESM will replace the EFSF. The crucial 
difference between the two is that its credits will be senior to 
those of private investors. The idea is to make default possible, 
with only a moderate risk to the budget of the creditor nations. 
By 2013, the European banks should be in a better position 
                                                 
20 The fund will  provide assistance only as a last resort, by unanimity and with 
harsh conditionality, 
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than today to absorb big losses, or so one hopes, therefore there 
could be the end of crisis. But unfortunately financial markets 
do not follow such ideas. What has been happening is that 
forward-looking investors see through this scheme, and 
correctly assess the risk of a future default, also for existing 
bonds. They know that once a country defaults, old and new 
bonds will be treated alike. Policymakers in Germany or 
France are just as unlikely to push for a managed default in 
2013 as they are now. In 2013 the crisis will not be ended, so 
they will make another loan with high interest rates, and 
demand another austerity plan – one that stands as little chance 
of success as the present ones. This game will continue until 
the debtor country’s economy collapses under its debt burden, 
at which point the inevitable default will be very unpleasant21.  
     All debt crises are politically difficult to solve because they 
involve making choices about who will ultimately bear the 
burden of the accumulated debt, between the borrowers, the 
lenders and the taxpayers. The comprehensive solution to the 
euro area crisis cannot avoid some difficult, but inevitable and 
transparent, political choices. A reasonable and coherent 
solution would be for instance to accept the principle of a bail-
out, not through cross-country transfers, but by means of a 
single European bond that replaces all national debt22.  
      The Pact of the Euro includes important commitments to 
prevent crisis that regard legislative measures to strengthen 
eurozone budget rules. The new regime will take into account 
the debt ratio and implicit liabilities23. The Pact, moreover, 
made it harder for politicians to veto fines 
                                                 
21 Probably the current policymakers may be no longer in office by then and can 
blame therefore their successors for the mess.  
22 The idea of Eurobonds is strongly supported by Quadrio Curzio (2010). 
23 So that a country with an oversized banking sector will have to factor in potential 
rescue costs 
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imposedԜonԜrecalcitrant debtors.    Another positive aspect is the 
recognition that not all crises are rooted in a lack of budgetary 
discipline. It is now agreed that financial stability and 
macroeconomic stability also matter.  The Pact also commits 
the euro partners to closer economic co-ordination and to a 
series of new austerity measures, including close monitoring of 
pension schemes, and limits on public sector wage increases. 
As it stands, however, the Pact remains an agreement on 
principles without enforcement24.  
     But some problems remain unsoved. There is an urgent 
need to expedite the resolution of the banking crisis. Moreover, 
an equally important need is to sort out state insolvency cases 
from illiquidity cases (Greece is likely to find itself insolvent 
and there are questions about Ireland and Portugal). The issue 
of exit strategy for the ECB that needs to know how it will get 
rid of the peripheral bonds on its balance sheet. The question of 
how the eurozone periphery will achieve debt sustainability, 
since there is still no serious answer to the problem of 
sustainability of public debt.  Finally, the eurozone needs a 
strategy to revive growth particularly in southern Europe. 
 
Conclusions. 
     The new governance of the EMU has given a response to 
the crisis which certainly made important corrections to the 
original weaknesses. However, several issues remain open. 
This contribution has underlined the need of a greater 
                                                 
24 Germany and the President of ECB, Trichet, backed a version that included the 
possibility of sanctions for violators. 
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cooperation among the member countries to implement the 
economic policies, a coopetitive strategy to face 
macroeconomic imbalances, a more effective fiscal policy 
regime. The need for a clearer solution of the debt crisis. But it 
is crucial the good health of the banking system, the 
sustainability of the debt burden of the peripheral countries and 
a medium term strategy for growth based on reforms that 
would help the eurozone economies grow out of increased 
public debt. 
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